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Susswein: Divorce Related Property Division v. Alimony, Maintenance and Sup

NOTE
DIVORCE RELATED PROPERTY DIVISION V.
ALIMONY, MAINTENANCE AND SUPPORT IN
THE BANKRUPTCY CONTEXT: A DISTINCTION
WITHOUT A DIFFERENCE?
I. INTRODUCTION
What debts should individuals have to pay, even after they have
filed a petition seeking relief under the Bankruptcy Code?' Congress
attempted to answer this question through section 523 of the Code,
which lists those debts excepted from discharge.2 As a general rule,
if a debt is not excepted from discharge, the debtor will be relieved
of the obligation to pay the debt under the various discharge provisions of the Code. For example, a debtor must fulfill the obligation to
pay certain debts incurred as a result of a divorce proceeding. Section
523(a)(5) provides that alimony, maintenance and support obligations
for a spouse or a child shall not be dischargeable. While a husband3
is entitled to a fresh start free of past debts, the state has a great
interest in requiring that the husband meet his support obligations to
his ex-wife and children.4 Unfortunately, the actual application of
section 523(a)(5) has been riddled with problems.
These application problems exist because § 523(a)(5) does not
apply to divorce obligations characterized as property division.5 The

1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1991). Any references to "the Code" or section numbers
without further reference will refer to the Bankruptcy Code.

2. All debts not satisfied through liquidation or accounted for in a confirmed reorganization plan are discharged unless otherwise provided for in the Code. Section 363 provides
that a creditor may take no action to collect or enforce a debt that has been discharged.
Section 523 is the laundry list of debts which are excepted from the general discharge provisions.
3. For the purpose of clarity this Note refers to the debtor-spouse as the husband and
the creditor-spouse as the wife, although the Code does not make such a distinction, and the
situation could certainly be reversed.
4. Joan Kingsly Gottesman, Comment, Reconciling Bankruptcy's Fresh Start Policy with

Marital Obligations In re Spong, 49 BROOK. L. RBv. 777, 777 (1983).
5. BENJAMIN WEINTRAUB & ALAN N. RESNICK, BANKRuPTCy LAW MANuAL 3-58 to
3-62 (3d ed. 1992).
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distinction between support and property division obligations leads to
manipulation at the time of divorce because the debtor-spouse can
negotiate a greater portion of property settlement into obligations
which would be characterized by the bankruptcy court as property
division, which is not excepted from discharge. Additionally, the
distinction between property division and alimony, maintenance and
support takes on an artificial significance, resulting in unnecessary
litigation at both the state and federal levels. The distinction is artificial because outside of the bankruptcy context, it affords no benefit to
either spouse.6 A divorcing spouse does not care what the benefits
are called as long as the spouse receives them.
Ironically, the Code requires a creditor-spouse to persuade a
judge that a divorce obligation is in the nature of support when the
trend in state courts is to use property division remedies to function
as support.7 The distinction between support and property division
has become blurred (if not altogether meaningless) because the characteristics and purpose underlying support payments and property
division have become inextricably intertwined.' Furthermore, the support/property distinction9 increasingly forces bankruptcy courts to
perform tasks that traditionally belong to the state court system. 10 In
order to determine dischargeability for a divorce-related debt, a bankruptcy judge must characterize an award as either support-based or
property-based and, in doing so, must perform functions that properly
should be handled by the state court judges.
These problems need not exist. If Congress were to recognize
that the distinction between property division and support is no longer
needed, both could be excepted from discharge. Part II of this Note
analyzes why Congress drafted § 523 to include alimony, maintenance
and support while excluding property divisions. Part I argues that
the justifications for the support/property distinction no longer have
any force. Part IV demonstrates that the application of the support/property distinction relies upon premises that no longer work.

6. Id.
7. Jana B. Singer, Divorce Obligations and Bankruptcy Discharge: Rethinking the Support/Property Distinction, 30 HARV. J. ON LFwis. 43, 74 (1993).
8. Id. at 43.
9. Post-divorce obligations in the nature of alimony, maintenance and support are often
simply called "support," while property divisions are referred to as "property." The distinction
between the two is referred to as the support/property distinction.
10. Sheryl L. Scheible, Bankruptcy and the Modification of Support: Fresh Start, Head
Start, or False Start?, 69 N.C. L. REv. 577, 581 (1991).
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Finally, this Note concludes that all divorce-created debts to an exspouse should be excepted from discharge.
II.

CONGRESS HAS USED THE SUPPORT/PROPERTY DIsTINcIoN TO

BALANCE CONFLICTING BANKRUPTCY AND FAMILY LAW POLICIES

The primary goal of bankruptcy law, dating back to 1898,1 is
to provide a debtor with a "fresh start," free from indebtedness. 2
The primary tool for this fresh start is discharge from one's debts.' 3
Once a debtor receives a discharge for debts incurred prior to petition
for bankruptcy relief, the debts no longer exist and a creditor cannot
make any attempt to collect them. 4 Since discharge is the primary
benefit and motivation for debtors to file for bankruptcy, Congress
remains cautious in creating exceptions to the general discharge provisions. Congress has only done so when important policies conflict.' 5
A husband's obligation to support his children and ex-wife have long
been recognized as important social responsibilities with greater significance than ordinary debts. 6 The policy of enforcing a husband's
divorce obligations to his ex-wife and children conflicts directly with
bankruptcy's fresh start policy.
In 1978, Congress passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 to
make bankruptcy relief more widely available to individual debtors.
During Congress' debate on how to reform the Bankruptcy Act, a
number of competing proposals were introduced. One of the proposed

bills came from a commission appointed by Congress to analyze and
update the bankruptcy laws. 7 The Commission recommended, among
8
other alterations, a change in the exception to discharge provisions.
11. The primary policies embodied in the bankruptcy law to this day were established
by the National Bankruptcy Act of 1898.
12.

See WEINTRAUB & RESNICK, supra note 5, at 3-2.

13. Gottesman, supra note 4, at 777.
14. See 11 U.S.C. § 524 (1991) (detailing the effects of discharge).
15. Examples of other debts which the Code excepts from discharge under § 523 are:
(I) taxes; (2) debts incurred through acts of fraud or misrepresentation; (3) debts incurred for
willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or property of another entity; (4)
student loans; and (5) debts incurred for deaths or personal injury caused by a debtor driving
while intoxicated.
16. See Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 74 (1904) (A husband's obligation "is not
[merely] a debt which has been put in the form of a judgment, but is rather a legal means
of enforcing the obligation of the husband and father to support and maintain his wife and
children.").
17. Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, §§ 1-6. 84 Stat. 468 (1970), as amended
by Pub. L. No. 92-251, 86 Stat. 63 (1972). This law established the Commission on the
Bankruptcy Laws of the United States.
18. The old Bankruptcy Act provision read as follows:
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The Commission proposed that all divorce-related debt to an exspouse be excepted from discharge. 9

Primary opposition to the Commission's proposals came from the
National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges, which submitted a proposed version of the bill far more protective of the debtor-spouse and

the fresh start policy.' The judges argued that any non-support-related settlement lies outside of the policy goals of family law and therefore should not be treated as an exception to discharge."
The judges were also concerned with the effect the

Commission's proposal would have on consumer debts and "hold
harmless" agreements for marital debts.' The Commission's broader
proposal would enable a wife to require her husband to pay these
debts to creditors or reimburse her for doing so. The bankruptcy
judges argued that these debts were not support related but rather a

division of property that did not require the exception to discharge.
Furthermore, they argued that creditors whose debts were included in

a couple's property settlement agreement would ultimately receive the
benefits of exception to discharge when they had no right to such

§ 17. DEBTS NOT AFFECTED BY A DISCHARGE.
a. A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable
debts, whether allowable in full or in part, except such as . . .
(7) are for alimony due or to become due, or for maintenance or support of
wife or child, or for seduction of an unmarried female, or for breach of
promise of a marriage accompanied by seduction, or for criminal conversion.
IA COLLIER ON BANKRupTCY 24 (Lawrence P. King. et al. eds., 1991) (The first appendix
to COLLIER reproduces the entire Bankruptcy Act).
19. REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON THE BANKRUpTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R.
Doec. No. 93-137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. II at 136 (1973). The provision provided exception from discharge for "any liability to a spouse or child for maintenance or support, for
alimony due or to become due, or under a property settlement in connection with a separation agreement or divorce decree."
20. The Commission's bill and the Bankruptcy Judges' bill were introduced in the 94th
Congress as H.R. 31 and H.R. 32. respectively. H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R.
32, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
21.
If [the ex-spouse] forgoes alimony and takes everything in something entitled
"property division," the courts have had no difficulty in seeing through that property settlement title. If they [find] . . . an element of support, they are not troubled
by that. Whatever they consider to be legitimate support will not be affected. It is
only that part in excess of that support.
Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and ConstitutionalRights of
the Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 304 (1975) (statement of Hon. Daniel
R. Cowans, fmr. Bankr. J.) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R 31 and H.R. 32].
22. When a couple divorces, they need to divide up both the assets and the liabilities
of the marriage. Under a hold harmless agreement, the husband agrees to pay the joint marital debt for the couple and not to seek any indemnification or reimbursement from the wife.
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Testifying before Congress, Judge Lee expressed concern

over a husband's ability to support his ex-wife and children when
saddled with numerous marital debts for which discharge is unavail-

able.' This begs the question-how would the wife get by if she is
saddled with these very same debts that were to be paid by her ex-

husband under the terms of their divorce? The answer from Judge
Lee was clear-she should file for bankruptcy to obtain relief from
her debts.' The narrower exception proposed by the Conference in
H.R. 32 was eventually incorporated into the Code.'
A. The Current Exception to Discharge Affects Family Law Policies
Aimed At Divorcing Spouses Whether or not the Spouses Eventually
File for Bankruptcy
While the Judges' Conference specifically focused on joint debts
to third parties, the language of § 523(a)(5) maintains discharge for

any type of property division that is in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support. One example of such a property division would
concern ownership of a house where the debtor would keep the house
and the creditor-spouse would receive periodic payments and a lien

on the property as compensation for her share in the ownership. The
lien interest affords the wife greater protection against the husband's
default, but loopholes exist for the husband to avoid these liens and
strip the wife of her protection.27 Such risks are significant enough
23. This would occur under the Commission's proposed exception because the husband
would remain liable for the debts enumerated in the hold harmless agreement. Hearings on
H.R. 31 and H.R. 32, supra note 21, at 1288 (statement of Hon. Joe Lee, Bankr. J.).
24. It.
25. Id.
26. See HOUSE COMMSSION Op THE HOUSE JUDICIARY BANKRUPTCY LAW REVISION,
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1977). The current language of § 523(A) reads:
A discharge . . . does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt(5) to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of such spouse of child, in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of record, determination made in accordance with state or territorial law by a governmental
unit or property settlement but not to the extent that(B) such debt includes a liability designated as alimony, maintenance,
or support, unless such liability is actually in the nature of alimony,
maintenance or support;
3 COLLmER ON BANKRUuTcY, supra note 18, at 523-103. This exception is quite similar to
the exception that was incorporated in the Bankruptcy Act of Feb. 5, 1903, ch. 487, § 17,
32 Stat. 797, 798 (1903). Cf. supra note 19.
27. Briefly, § 522(f) affords a debtor the right to avoid a judicial lien placed on exempt
property. While homestead exemptions vary greatly from state to state, some courts have used
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that a bill has been introduced in Congress to try to afford the credi-

tor-spouse greater protection.'

The ultimate issue concerns whether

the discharge provisions should even apply to such a transaction.29
The current version of § 523(a)(5) can have an unintended effect
upon divorce negotiations. The risk of default by a debtor-spouse is a
disincentive for creditor-spouses to agree to a credit relationship with
the debtor-spouse. For this reason, the creditor-spouse would not want
to allow the debtor-spouse to retain marital property in exchange for
future payments. Divorcing couples are thereby encouraged to sell
property and split the proceeds, rather than agree that one of them

retain the property while making payments to the other.
For example, the upheavals of divorce are exacerbated by bank-

ruptcy risks that discourage a spouse from remaining in the primary
residence. The Code should not add to the trauma of divorce by
encouraging both spouses to move just to avoid a debtor-creditor rela-

tionship. This condition is worsened where the divorcing parties have
children. One must choose between allowing the children to spend
some of their time in the marital home (thereby accepting the risks of
bankruptcy) and forcing both spouses to move so that a debtor-credi-

tor relationship is not created between them (thereby adding to the
upheaval the children must experience).

this Code section to avoid a lien against property used as the security in a divorce decree.
There are some courts that view this section as including these types of liens and some that
deem these security interests not applicable to § 522(0. For more detail, see Phyllis A. Klein,
Note, A Fresh Start with Someone Else's Property: Lien Avoidance, the Homestead Exemption
and Divorce Property Divisions under Section 522()(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, 59
FORDHAM L. REv. 423 (1990); Darilyn T. Olidge, Note, Divorce Liens Under Section 522(f)
of the Federal Bankruptcy Code: Resolving Tensions Between Family and Bankruptcy Law,
67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 879 (1992).
28. S. 540, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (introduced by Sen. Heflin). As part of proposed legislation to improve the administration of the bankruptcy system, Senator Heflin
introduced substantial legislation which if enacted will be known as the "Bankruptcy Amendments Act of 1993." The bill amends § 522(f)(1)(A) of title 11 of the U.S.C. as follows:
(A) a judicial lien (other than a judicial lien that secures a debt to a
spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for, or
support of the spouse or child, in connection with a separation agreement, divorce
decree or other order of a court of record, determination made in accordance with
State or territorial law by a governmental unit, or property settlement agreement, to
the extent that the debt(i) is not assigned to another entity, voluntarily, by operation of law, or
otherwise; and
(ii) includes a liability designated as alimony, maintenance, or support, unless such liability is actually in the nature of alimony maintenance or support).
29. See infra text accompanying notes 114-15.
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Any divorcing couple should be careful to minimize bankruptcy
risks during divorce negotiations, including those risks related to
divorce liens and the marital home. In addition, it may be in the
couple's joint economic interest to have one spouse retain property
and have the other one receive payments. Consider a couple that
owns a family business and must either sell it and divide the proceeds, or create a debtor-creditor relationship. No reasonable justification exists for the bankruptcy system to wield such a strong influence
over a divorce negotiation, especially since property division and
support have become so intertwined that one cannot discern where
support ends and property division begins.
III. UNDERSTANDING THE ORIGIN OF THE SUPPORT/PROPERTY
DISTINCTION

Originally, practical justifications existed for treating alimony,
maintenance and support differently from property division. First,
characteristics of property division used to differ substantively from
those characteristics described as support?0 Second, spousal support,
and not distribution of marital property, represented the primary
means of alleviating financial need and achieving economic equity at
the time of divorce.31
Today, property division has replaced alimony in its function of
support, and widespread changes in the law make any distinction
between the two insignificant. One prominent scholar stated "the
alimony-property distinction is neither sensible nor workable, and in
fact is largely illusory." 2
A. Alimony and Property Division as Originally Conceived
Alimony arose out of the duty of a husband to support his
wife.3 The duty usually took the form of monthly payments continuing indefinitely until death or the wife's remarriage, when her new
husband would assume the duty of support.' Since no-fault divorce

30. Singer, supra note 7, at 44-45.
31. Id.
32. HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

467 (2d ed. 1988).
33. Joan M. Krauskopf, Theories of Property DivisionlSpousal Support: Searching for
Solutions to the Mystery, 23 FAM. L.Q. 253, 256 (1989).
34. Suzanne Reynolds, The Relationship of Property Division and Alimony: The Division
of Property to Address Need, 56 FoRDHAM L. REV. 827, 831 (1988).
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did not exist, a husband had the duty to support his ex-wife if he
was at fault for allowing the marriage to dissolve.' Conversely, if
his wife was at fault for the failure of the marriage, she was not
entitled to alimony.36 Therefore, alimony was originally punitive in
nature." The purpose was to provide for the ongoing needs of the
wife, and as such, alimony was purely forward-looking.3 8 Since alimony was need-based, a change in the circumstances of either spouse
permitted the state court to modify the alimony obligations to reflect
the changed circumstances.39
On the other hand, property division was backward-looking.'
The purpose was to unscramble the property ownership interests in
assets acquired during the marriage." Property division usually took
the form of a one-time lump sum payment.42 Since these obligations
stemmed from the disentanglement of property rights, no change in
circumstances gave rise to a modification of a court-ordered division
of assets.43
Due to a revolution in state divorce law, these two distinct remedies have been merged into a new system that is based upon different
premises and guided by different goals, requiring a reorientation of
the bankruptcy discharge exception.
B. The Divorce Law Revolution and Equitable Distribution
One searches in vain for a concise, all-encompassing or universally applicable definition of equitable distribution. However,
even the most cursory review of cases in various jurisdictions reveals general agreement among the courts with respect to the theory
and concepts that underlie statutes that require or authorize the
equitable distribution of property upon the dissolution of marriage.

35. Scheible, supra note 10, at 583. Until the advent of no fault divorce, divorce was
not available without one party having breached some marital duty which created fault. Idl;
see also JOHN D. GREGORY, THE LAW OF EQUITABLE DISTRIBuTION 9-12 (1989) [hereinafter
GREGORY, EQUITABLE DIsTRIBUIroN] (stating that grounds for divorce have become irrelevant
and that legislatures have abolished the concept of the matrimonial offense).
36. Scheible, supra note 10, at 583 n.31.
37. Id
38. Singer, supra note 7, at 68.
39. See UNiFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORcE Acr (UMDA) § 316B, 9A U.L.A. 147, 490
(1987).
40. Singer, supra note 7, at 68-69.
41. Id.
42. Scheible, supra note 10, at 588.
43. Id

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol22/iss3/8

8

Susswein: Divorce Related Property Division v. Alimony, Maintenance and Sup
1994]

PROPERTY DIVISION V. SUPPORT

The hallmarks of the system are broad discretion for trial courts to
assign to either spouse property acquired during the marriage, irrespective of title, taking into account the circumstances of the particular case and recognizing the value of the contributions of a nonworking spouse or homemaker to the acquisition of that property.
Simply stated, the system of equitable distribution views marriage as
essentially a shared enterprise or joint undertaking in the nature of a
partnership to which both spouses contribute---directly and indirectly,
financially and nonfinancially-the fruits of which are distributable
at divorce."
Today, almost every state uses a system of equitable distribution

in place of alimony, and the practice of no-fault divorce is commonplace."

Under equitable distribution several factors, all relating to

the needs of the spouses and fairness in dividing marital gains and
losses, are used to produce a property settlement or divorce decree.'

While apportioning gains and losses is a stated goal of equitable distribution, the support policies of alimony along with the corresponding focus on the needs of the parties remains an integral part of
equitable distribution statutes.47 A good example of this is section

307 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act dealing with the disposition of property.4" A system of equitable distribution which utilizes

44. GREGORY, EQUITABLE DIsTRIBUTIoN, supra note 35, at 1-6.
45. Doris J. Freed & Timothy B. Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview,
23 FAM. L.Q. 495, 523-24 (1990).
46. See GREGORY, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION, supra note 35 at 1-7 (citing Rothman v.
Rothman, 65 N.J. 219 (1974)).
In Rothman v. Rothman, the Supreme Court of New Jersey stressed the remedial
nature of equitable distribution, citing two aspects of public policy that are served
by the authority of courts to distribute the parties' marital assets equitably. First,
divorced wives needing financial support are no longer limited to alimony, which
may end if the husband dies or becomes financially unable to continue payments.
Second, the equitable distribution statute recognizes "the essential supportive role
played by the wife in the home, acknowledging that as homemaker, wife and
mother she should clearly be entitled to a share of family assets accumulated during the marriage."
ld.
47. Therefore equitable distribution attempts to accomplish both the alimony goal of providing support and the property division goal of unscrambling property interests through one
single remedial system.
48.
(a) . . . In making apportionment the court shall consider the duration of the marriage . . . of either party, antenuptial agreement of the parties, the age, health,
station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability,
estate, liabilities, and needs of each of the parties, custodial provisions, whether the
apportionment is in lieu of or in addition to maintenance, and the opportunity of
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deal of judicial discremust consider to order
determine how much of
how much was merely

This is because the purpose of dividing marital property, under
most equitable division schemes, involves more than sorting out the
spouses' pre-existing ownership interests in marital assets; rather, it
is to allocate those assets between the spouses in a fashion that is
just, reasonable, or equitable. Moreover, in determining which distribution of property will satisfy these criteria, courts are typically
directed to consider not only historical factors such as the spouses'
economic and noneconomic contributions to the marriage, but also
such forward-looking criteria as the spouses' post-divorce incomes,
employment prospects, and financial needs. Indeed, many equitable
distribution statutes focus more on the parties' post-divorce circumstances than on factors relating to the acquisition of assets. These
statutes justify the inference that the purpose of equitable distribution "is as much to provide for the financial needs of the spouses
after the divorce as to award to each what he or she equitably
owns. "50
Equitable distribution does away with many of the alimony characteristics, such as permanent periodic payments to the wife, replacing
them with a single lump sum or short series of substantial payments.
As shown above, the change in character of the property settlement
does not eliminate the support role of the remedy. Rather, property
division replaces alimony while continuing to serve its functions.5 '

each for future acquisition of capital assets and income. The court shall also con-

sider the contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition, preservation,
depreciation, or appreciation in value of the respective estates, and the contribution
of a spouse as a homemaker or to the family unit.
UMDA § 307(a), 9A U.L.A. 238-39 (1987).
49. JoHN D. GREGORY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FAmiLY LAw 345 (1993).
50. Singer, supra note 7, at 74 (emphasis added).
51. See UMDA § 308, 9A U.L.A. 147, 347 (1987).
§ 308. [Maintenance]
(a) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, legal separation, or maintenance
following a decree of dissolution of the marriage by a court which lacked personal
jurisdiction over the absent spouse, the court may grant a maintenance order for either spouse only if it finds that the spouse seeking maintenance:
(1) lacks sufficient property to provide for his reasonable needs; and
(2) is unable to support himself through appropriate employment or is the
custodian of a child whose condition or circumstances make it appropriate
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C. State Law Preferencesfor Property Division
Even if one could distinguish easily between which portion of a
settlement is support-based and which portion is a division of assets,
the current system for marital dissolution contradicts the approach that
the Bankruptcy Code uses in determining discharge. The bankruptcy

approach determines what portion of the debt was intended as support; the balance falls outside of the exception and is discharged with
any other unpaid debts.52 Since property division is now the preferred method of resolving the economic relationship of the parties,"3

the family law system works in the other direction.
Many states require that all potential property division solutions
be employed before any maintenance may be awarded to the
spouse. 4 Therefore, even if a spouse were to negotiate a settlement
that resembles alimony and avoids the risk of bankruptcy discharge
down the road, the state law may stand in her way because she must

exhaust property remedies first.
Thus, the bankruptcy system protects a spouse's right to support
awards but not her right to property awards, while the state system

that the custodian not be required to seek employment outside the home.
Id.
52. This is a simplified explanation of the application of § 523(A)(5), and will be explained in greater detail below. See infra part IV.
53. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
54. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 518.552 (1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-121 (1991). The
relevant language of these statutes is:
518.552. Maintenance
subdivision 1. In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage . . . the court may grant
a maintenance order for either spouse if it finds that the spouse seeking maintenance:
(a) lacks sufficient property, including marital property apportioned to the
spouse, to provide for reasonable needs of the spouse considering the standard of living established during the marriage, especially, but not limited to,
a period of training or education[.]
MiNN. STAT. § 518.552(l)(a) (1990).
36-4-121. Distribution of marital property--(a)(1) In all actions for divorce or separate support and maintenance, the court having jurisdiction thereof may, upon request of either party, and prior to any determinations as to whether it is appropriate to order the support and maintenance of one (1) party by the other, equitably divide, distribute or assign the marital property between the parties without
regard to marital fault in proportions as the court deems just.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-121(a)(1) (1991).
In providing for a spouse's needs, these statutes require that methods of dividing
property be employed before traditional ongoing support awards are used. Section 308 of the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act also employs this method of utilizing property division
prior to support payments to provide for the needs of the spouse. 9A U.L.A. 347.
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does not afford spouses support-type remedies until property remedies
have been exhausted. The Bankruptcy Code, is therefore, out of step
with the state court system of equitable distribution.
D. Contract and the Support/PropertyDistinction
The substantive changes in state law have been coupled with
procedural changes that further diminish the support/property distinction. Due to the increase in the number of divorces and a desire to
encourage amicable dissolution of marriages, an increased flexibility
exists to allow the parties to negotiate and draft their own settlement.55 This also fosters a greater degree of certainty in the process,
since the parties can negotiate the settlement that they feel is best for
themselves.56 Under these circumstances, the parties are not likely to
concern themselves about whether their settlement is characterized as
support or property division. Rather, they will only be concerned with
the bottom line amount of their settlement. Since the parties cannot
be sure how a bankruptcy court would characterize their settlement,
the policy of discharging property division obligations undermines the
certainty that the system provides the parties.
In addition, the contracting process is complicated further by the
Code because of the greater risk attendant to deferred payments. Consider, for example, a situation where the couple must divide ownership in a family business. One spouse would like to keep the business
and pay off the other spouse through installment payments, especially
if the business is worth more to operate than it is to sell. As stated
previously, the creditor-spouse has a disincentive to face the risk of
discharge accompanying such an arrangement, and an incentive to
force the sale of the business. Not only does this undermine family
law policy of fostering amicable property settlements,' ironically it

55. Section 306(a) of the UMDA states:
ft]o promote amicable settlement of disputes between parties to a marriage attendant upon their separation or the dissolution of their marriage, the parties may

enter into a written separation agreement containing provisions for disposition of
any property owned by either of them, maintenance of either of them, and support,

custody, and visitation of their children.
UMDA § 306(a), 9A U.L.A. 216; Scheible, supra note 10, at 591.

56. This certainty is undermined by the bankruptcy process because a spouse cannot be
sure whether the bankruptcy judge would characterize her award as property division or support. See Scheible, supra note 10, at 592; see also UMDA § 306, 9A U.L.A. 216 (providing

for parties to order their own lives through negotiated property settlement agreements).
57. UMDA § 306, 9A U.L.A. 216.
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also undermines bankruptcy's own policy of preserving going-concern
value.5" Divorcing parties are not like regular contracting parties that
negotiate at arm's length and implicitly agree to face the risks of
default and discharge; rather, they have no choice but to come to
some agreement or have the court fashion one for them.
Congress has addressed the difficulty in distinguishing support
from property division, and has seen fit to eliminate the distinction
for tax purposes.5 9 "Congress has recently recognized that the income
tax treatment of payments made pursuant to a divorce settlement or
decree should not depend upon whether the payments fit more neatly
into the pigeonhole labeled property or the pigeonhole labeled support."'6
Moreover, in 1990 Representative Henry Hyde introduced a bill
which would extend the alimony, maintenance and support exception
to discharge to include divorce-related property division, but Congress
failed to enact such a proposal for the second time.6 The proposed
legislation, known as the Property Settlement Integrity Act of 1990,
would have amended the Code to "make nondischargeable debts for
liabilities under the terms of a property settlement agreement entered
into in connection with a separation agreement or divorce decree."'62
Although the bill was not enacted, it indicates that some members of
Congress understand the flaws inherent in the support/property distinction.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE SUPPORT/PROPERTY DISTINCTION
Since the passage of the Bankruptcy Code, the bankruptcy courts
have been struggling to come up with a standard application, so that

58. A family business would presumably sell for less than the value of the income
stream that it produces, thereby yielding less than the going concern value of the business.
Bankruptcy law attempts to preserve the going concern value of businesses so as not to diminish the interests of creditors or equity holders. WEntrRAUB & RESNICK, supra note 5, at
8-3.
59. Domestic Relations Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494, 793
(1986).
60. Singer, supra note 7, at 78-79. Ironically, the parties tax interests with regard to the
support/property distinction run counter to their bankruptcy interests because the support payments are deducted from the debtor's income tax return and added to the creditor's return
whereas property division would not affect their returns. Therefore, for tax purposes only, the
debtor would want the award to be characterized as (non-dischargeable) support and the creditor would want the award to be characterized as (dischargeable) property division.
61. H.R. 5203, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (introduced by Rep. Henry Hyde (R., Ill.)).
62. Id.
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divorcing parties could have some idea of how a bankruptcy judge
would characterize a claim that arose under a divorce decree. This
section analyzes the bankruptcy courts' struggle to develop a workable rule for the support/property distinction.
Although the exception dates back to 1903,63 the enactment of
the Code in 1978 resulted in one major change in characterizing an
award. No longer would the state court's characterization of the
award as support or property division govern the outcome; 6' rather,
the bankruptcy court would make its own determination as to the
nature of the award.'s The wording of § 523(a)(5)(b) makes clear
that labels within a divorce decree or property settlement are not to
govern the characterization. The section limits the exception to those
awards that are "actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance, and
support."'
A.

The Intent Test and Present Circumstances Test

While courts have not applied § 523 with any uniformity, there
is a consensus among the circuits to use some form of an intent
test.67 In characterizing an award, many courts look only to what the
parties or state court judge intended' the award to be at the time of
the divorce.69 This test is a misnomer because the courts do not actually look at the parties' intent. If courts used a true intent test, they
would simply use the words and labels in the agreement or decree to
determine whether an award was meant to be alimony, maintenance
or support. Instead, in determining the intent of the parties or state
court judge, the bankruptcy court looks at the circumstances at the
time of divorce. If the obligation was reasonably necessary to maintain the spouse's needs, it will be characterized as non-dischargeable
support; if not, it will be treated as dischargeable property division."

63. Bankruptcy Act of Feb. 5, 1903, ch. 487, § 17, 32 Stat. 797, 798 (1903).
64. See In re Waller, 494 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1974) (holding that the federal bankruptcy
court must look to the state court's determination to determine dischargeability).
65. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 364 (1977).
66. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)(B). "[S]uch debt includes a liability designated as alimony,
maintenance, or support, unless such liability is actually in the nature of alimony, mainte-

nance, or support." Id
67. See, e.g., Yeates v. Yeates, 807 F.2d 874, 878 (10th Cir. 1986); Boyle v. Donovan,
724 F.2d 681, 683 (8th Cir. 1984); In re Calhoun, 715 F.2d 1103, 1109 (6th Cir. 1983).

68. Throughout this section, "intent" refers to the parties to a property settlement
agreement or to the judge who ordered the divorce decree.

69. Yeates, 807 F.2d at 878; Boyle, 724 F.2d at 683; Calhoun, 715 F.2d at 1109.
70. See Scheible, supra note 10, at 595.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol22/iss3/8

14

Susswein: Divorce Related Property Division v. Alimony, Maintenance and Sup
19941

PROPERTY DIVISION V. SUPPORT

Therefore the intent test is actually a "function" or "needs" test.7"
Some bankruptcy courts have taken the needs analysis in the
intent test further, by analyzing the present circumstances of the parties as well as their circumstances at the time of divorce.' This
present circumstances test originated in Warner v. Warner, in which
the court, in an attempt to balance the equities and competing policies, analyzed whether the spouse still needed the support payments.73 Since the spouse's needs were the reason for the exception
from discharge, the spouse was not entitled to the exception because
she no longer needed the support.74 The Warner approach has been
criticized for improperly attempting to balance competing policies
when it applied a present circumstances analysis.
By creating an exception to the general rule of discharge, Congress,
implicitly, resolved the balancing of the very interests considered by
the court below in favor of the [creditor] spouse. Congress did not,
in any manner, manifest an intention that the bankruptcy courts
should embark upon their own balancing of these policies. Under
section 523(a)(5), the bankruptcy courts are free to determine whether a debt characterized by a state court as alimony, support, or
maintenance is in fact just that. Upon finding that a debt is in fact
support, alimony, or maintenance, however, the bankruptcy court is
not free to discharge the debt. Section 523(a)(5) states clearly that
such debts are not to be discharged.'

71. Id.; see Yeates, 807 F.2d at 878.
72. Warner v. Warner, 5 B.R. 434, 442 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980).
73. Id.; see also Scheible, supra note 10, at 596-601 (describing and critiquing the
Warner approach).
74. Warner, 5 B.R. at 442-43.
75. In re Nelson, 20 B.R. 1008, 1011-12 (M.D. Tenn. 1982).
In an attempt to establish more concrete guidelines for distinguishing between
alimony, maintenance, and support, and obligations in the nature of a property
settlement, the bankruptcy court in In re Nelson listed eleven factors usually taken
into consideration when determining the true intentions of the parties or the state
divorce court: (1) whether the obligations of payment terminate upon the death of
either spouse or upon remarriage of the spouse benefitted by the payments; (2)
whether the obligation terminates when the dependent children reach maturity age
or are otherwise emancipated; (3) whether the payments are to be made directly to
the spouse; (4) the relative earnings of the parties; (5) evidence that the spouse relinquished rights in property in return for the payment of the obligations; (6) the
length of the parties' marriage and the number of dependent children; (7) the document itself and any inferences that can be drawn from placement of specific
provisions within the document; (8) whether the debt was incurred for the immediate living expenses of the spouse; (9) whether the payments were intended for the
economic safety of the dependent(s); (10) whether the obligation is enforceable by
contempt; and (11) whether the payments are payable in installments over a sub-
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The Warner approach is further discredited by comparing the alimony, maintenance and support exception to the student loan exception
in the Code.76 The student loan exception specifically provides that
if the debt "will impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the
debtor's dependents[,]" ' then the bankruptcy court has the discretion
to grant discharge. Thus, if Congress sought to provide such discretion as the present circumstances test for alimony, maintenance and
support creates, it would have framed the language of the Code accordingly. 8

The present circumstances analysis was subsequently resurrected
by the Sixth Circuit in In re Calhoun,79 considered by many scholars
the most controversial opinion in this area.' The Calhoun court set
up a three step test for characterizing marital debts." First, the bankruptcy court should determine if the intent of the award was to support the creditor-spouse.82 Second, the court must determine if the

spouse presently depends upon the satisfaction of the debt for her
daily needs.8 3 Even if these are both satisfied, the bankruptcy court

stantial period of time.
WEINTRAUB & RESNICK, supra note 5, at 3-60 to 3-61.
76. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).
.77. Id.
78. See In re Nelson, 20 B.R. at 1011. In Nelson, the debtor fell behind in payments
owed to his ex-spouse pursuant to a support agreement and filed a petition for bankruptcy
under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy court below found a portion of the
debt to be in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support, but discharged the debt nonetheless on equitable grounds. The Tennessee district court held that Congress resolved the
balancing of the bankruptcy and family law policies when they created the alimony, maintenance and support exception, and "upon finding that a debt is in fact support, alimony or
maintenance . . . the bankruptcy court is not free to discharge the debt." Id. at 1011-12.
79. 715 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir. 1983). The disputed claims in the Calhoun case were five
loan obligations owed jointly by the debtor and his ex-wife to third parties. The debtor's
separation agreement provided that the debtor would hold his wife harmless for these five
obligations. The district court granted summary judgement for the creditor, his ex-wife, holding that the obligations were in the nature of support or alimony, and were therefore nondischargeable. The Sixth Circuit reversed, creating a new test for present circumstances. Id.
80. See, e.g., WEINTRAUB & RESNICK, supra note 5, at 3-62.
The Calhoun decision raised several troublesome questions . . . . [Ajlthough the
court in Calhoun stated that the bankruptcy court does not sit as a "super-divorce"
court, it remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court or courts in other circuits
will tolerate such an extensive intrusion by bankruptcy courts into issues concerning the reasonableness of support provisions.
Id. (emphasis added).
81. Calhoun, 715 F.2d at 1109-10.
82. Id4 at 1109.
83. Id.
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must then determine if the obligation is "manifestly unreasonable" in

light of the debtor's general ability to pay.' Only after consideration
of all three steps may a bankruptcy judge permit a debt to be excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(5).
In reference to the third step in the test, the Calhoun court decided that allowing unreasonable obligations to be excepted from
discharge would amount to allowing parties to contract their bankruptcy rights away.s On these grounds, the Calhoun opinion also
makes the point that a decree ordered by a state court should receive
more weight than a property settlement agreement negotiated by the
parties.'
The facts of In re Calhoun concerned marital debts that were
assumed by the husband through a hold harmless agreement." The
Calhoun opinion states that the present circumstances test should be
applied to cases involving marital debts assumed by the debtorspouse, and that this approach is not intended to turn the bankruptcy
court into a "super divorce court. 88 Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit

promptly extended the principles of the Calhoun test, noting that it
had "general applicability in cases brought under § 523(A)(5)."

9

Five circuits have examined and rejected the Calhoun test for
various reasons.' ° In Harrell v. Sharp," the Eleventh Circuit was

84. Id. at 1110.
85. Ma
86. Id at 1109-10 n.10.
87. Id at 1105.
88. Id. at 1110-11 nn.12, 14.
89. In re Singer, 787 F.2d 1033, 1038 n.2 (6th Cir. 1986).
90. In re Gianakas, 917 F.2d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1990); Sylvester v. Sylvester, 865 F.2d
1164, 1166 (10th Cir. 1989); Forsdick v. Turgeon, 812 F.2d 801, 803 (2d Cir. 1987); Draper
v. Draper, 790 F.2d 52, 54 (8th Cir. 1986); Harrell v. Sharp, 754 F.2d 902, 906 (lth Cir.
1985). Interestingly, the marital debts covered in the hold harmless agreement at issue in
Calhoun are just the type of obligations that the bankruptcy judges feared would interfere
with the fresh start policy when they lobbied Congress to reject an expanded version of
§ 523(a)(5).
91. 754 F.2d 902 (lth Cir. 1985). In Harrell, the debtor and his spouse agreed in
1971 that the debtor would pay his ex-wife a fixed monthly sum for her and her child's
support indefinitely, unless she remarried. Id at 903-04. Furthermore, he would pay for the
child's educational expenses in the future. Id. The debtor was in arrears in 1974, and the
agreement was amended to waive the arrearages and the debtor would set up a trust fund for
the child's education. Id. Subsequently, the debtor filed chapter VII and sought and received
a discharge on grounds that his ex-wife no longer needed support. Id The district court reversed on appeal, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's reversal. The Eleventh
Circuit actually referred more to the Warner decision than the Calhoun decision in rejecting
the present circumstances test. Id. at 906.
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the first to reject this new use of the present circumstances test in
§ 523(a)(5) cases.
The statutory language [of § 523] suggests a simple inquiry as to
whether the obligation can legitimately be characterized as support,
that is, whether it is in the nature of support. The language does
not suggest a precise inquiry into financial circumstances to determine precise levels of need or support; nor does the statutory language contemplate an ongoing assessment of need as circumstances
change.'
Significantly, the Harrell opinion criticizes the present circumstances test because it interferes with state domestic relations law. In
this sense, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the Calhoun court's contention that the present circumstances test need not lead to bankruptcy
courts acting as super-divorce courts. The Eleventh Circuit did not
want to "embroil federal courts in domestic relations matters which
should properly be reserved to the state courts."93 Consequently, the
federal courts should conduct a limited "inquiry into whether or not
the obligation at issue is in the nature of support."' The Harrell
court further stated "there will be no necessity for a precise investigation of the spouse's circumstances to determine the appropriate level
of need or support."'95
In Forsdick v. Turgeon,9 the Second Circuit's analysis of the
Calhoun test was somewhat different, but the result was the same.
Congress created an exception to discharge based upon the support/property distinction. If the state court assessed the debtor with an
obligation intended to provide support for his wife, then the bankruptcy court's job is to protect the creditor's right to support through the
exception to discharge.' There may be no disruption of state law
mechanism absent "an unmistakable mandate from Congress to do so
' The Third Circuit
in order to achieve a valid federal objective."98

92. Id. at 906.

93. Id. at 907.
94. Id.
95. d.
96. 812 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1987). In 1981, the Connecticut Superior Court awarded the

debtor's wife $100,000 in "non-modifiable alimony" paid over seven years in monthly installments. Debtor filed chapter 7 three years later, and the bankruptcy court held the award was
non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(5). Both the district court and the circuit court affirmed. Id

at 801, 802.
97. Id. at 804.
98. Id.
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agreed with the Second Circuit's reasoning and added that a present
circumstances test would "serve essentially as a penalty for a former
spouse who may have struggled to gain self-sufficiency."'
A Pennsylvania district court put it best when it explained how a
present circumstances test would serve to write the exception out of
the Code.
To allow a bankruptcy court to take into consideration the parties'
changed financial circumstances in determining whether an obligation constitutes ... support would be to rule that such agreements
are dischargeable in nearly every case. In most cases, by the time a
debtor has filed for bankruptcy, the economic condition of his or
her ex-spouse will be at least on par with, if not more favorable
than, that of the debtor, who, after all, has been driven to bankruptcy by his debts. The debtor's proper remedy in this case is not to
avoid this debt through bankruptcy, but to petition to the court with
jurisdiction over his or her divorce decree for a modification of any
such agreement in light of changed circumstances."
B. Why Neither Test is an Acceptable Solution
The premise behind using only an intent test is based on the
assumption that the state court or divorcing parties intended to create
an award that is either support or property division related. However,
as stated above, property division and alimony share the same purpose and characteristics.' Therefore, bankruptcy courts are applying
§ 523(a)(5) under two failed standards. Either the bankruptcy judge
attempts to interpret whether the state court judge intended the award
as support or property division," or the bankruptcy judge replaces
the state court judge by making an independent needs analysis based
upon the circumstances that are present.0 3 Under the first scenario,
the bankruptcy judge faces an impossible task of interpreting distinctions that do not exist, and under the second scenario the bankruptcy
court intrudes on the province of the state courts by assessing the
proper needs of the parties.

99. In re Gianakas, 917 F.2d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1990).
100. In re Chedrick, 98 B.R. 731, 734 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
101. See supra text accompanying notes 44-51.
102. This happens through the application of the intent test in most circuits. See supra
text accompanying notes 67-71.
103. This is done through the application of the Calhoun test in the Sixth Circuit. See
supra text accompanying notes 79-89.
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Congress' effort to reconcile conflicting policies has led to a
system that is both unworkable and damaging to state family law
policy. The bankruptcy courts are forced to act as "super-divorce"
courts and thereby intrude on the province of the state courts."° Rejection of the Calhoun test in five Circuits advanced comity with
state law as a significant concern for federal bankruptcy courts t 5
The problem is that, even when a bankruptcy court is limiting its
analysis to an intent test, it is still interpreting the function of an
award made by the state court judge rather than allowing the state
courts to make that determination themselves. This means that even
the circuits applying a mere intent test run the risk of acting as super-divorce courts, despite recognizing that this is not their role.
Under an intent test, the needs of divorcing parties must be
litigated both at divorce proceedings and again at the bankruptcy
dischargeability hearing. This leads to litigating twice the issue of the
respective parties' needs at the time of divorce."° Even if federal
intrusion on state law policies were not an issue, this would provide
bankrupt debtors with a "second bite at the apple" in proving that the
creditor-spouse did not need the state court award in the first place.
This system is unfair for another reason. In state court, support
awards can be modified if circumstances change and the state judge
decides that support must be either increased or decreased."°7 But
when a bankruptcy court recharacterizes an award as property division
under an intent test or a present circumstances test, the debtor can
gain the benefits of a downward modification of support without any
risks of an upward modification of support as could occur in state
court. 3
Of greater concern is the fact that spouses receiving an award in
state court face increased uncertainty in relying on that award to
support themselves. This does not allow a divorcing spouse to reorder

104. See WEINTRAUB & REsNICK, supra note 5, at 3-62; Scheible, supra note 10, at 581;
Singer, supra note 7, at 47.
105. See supra note 90.
106. In referring to present circumstances, the Eleventh Circuit criticized this circumstance. "Thus limited to its proper role, the bankruptcy court will not duplicate the functions
of state domestic relations courts, and its rulings will impinge on state domestic relations

issues in the most limited manner possible." Harrell v. Sharp, 754 F.2d 902, 907 (11th Cir.
1985).
107. See supra note 39.
108. This is so because discharge can only reduce the debtor's obligations, and therefore
the bankruptcy would never increase a spouse's award as the state court system could do in
a post divorce proceeding. See supra text accompanying notes 33-43.
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her life, knowing that she can depend upon the award that a state
divorce court has granted her."°
The fundamental flaw in the structure of the alimony, maintenance and support exception is that it still views divorcing parties in
a support/dependency relationship. Today, modem domestic law views
marriage as a "partnership between co-equals."' n If Congress would
recognize this change in perspective, it would see that the need to
limit exception from discharge to support awards is inappropriate.
V. PROPOSED CHANGE IN § 523 AND A TEMPORARY SOLUTION
The problems surrounding § 523(a)(5) of the Code result from
the fact that distinguishing alimony, maintenance and support from
property division is both meaningless and unworkable at the federal
level. Contrary to the federal bankruptcy approach, state law by and
large favors property division over alimony, maintenance, and support.
The states no longer view the functions of each as distinct and, therefore, the Bankruptcy Code must eventually change to reflect this
reality. This Note concludes that the alimony, maintenance and support exception to discharge should be expanded to make non-dischargeable debts for liabilities under the terms of a property settlement entered into in connection with a separation agreement or divorce decree. Congress has twice failed to enact such an exception.
However, since state law no longer views divorce obligations as
arising out of a husband's duty to support his wife, an issue that
must be addressed is whether the bankruptcy system is justified in
excepting any divorce obligations from discharge, let alone all of
them.
Even though family law scholars agree that the purpose of property division is to assess the marital gains and losses of the spouses,"' state law still treats these awards as duties of greater significance than ordinary contractual duties. 2 Any of these obligations
109. See Scheible, supra note 10, at 592. Homer Clark refers to such uncertainty when
he advises that:
Although bankruptcy should be considered by the parties as a possibility when
they are negotiating a separation agreement, the cases create so much uncertainty
about its impact on the financial provisions in divorce decress that they can do
little more than attach the label they wish to have applied and hope that the bankruptcy court will be persuaded by it.
CLARK, supra note 32, at 306.
110. See Singer, supra note 7, at 100.
111. See CLARK, supra note 32, at 181.
112. In fact, most equitable distribution statutes still use need for support as a factor in
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come with the threat of contempt for violating court orders. 1 ' In
addition both Congress and state legislatures are constantly trying to
find ways to close the enforcement loopholes in this area of the
4
law.1
These obligations also do not arise in the way that an ordinary
contract arises. A divorce obligation only occurs with the force of
state court approval behind it. In addition, these are never arms length
negotiations that a divorcing party may enter into or forego, as a
normal contracting party has the right to do. The property settlement
is a necessary step to ending the marital relationship, and therefore
bankruptcy risks can only be avoided by rejecting an award altogether.
One scholar points out that analysis of the fresh start policy was
not meant to protect divorce obligations at all.' 5 Rather the fresh
start policy was designed to protect debtors in their role as "consumers and commercial beings," and not in their role as spouse." 6 Lastly, society's interest in protecting obligations arising out of marriage
is justified by the spouses' mutual dependence upon each other
throughout the marriage, as well as the unique position marriage has
in providing for the care and nurturing of children." 7 Therefore,
Congress should extend the exception to all post-marital obligations
rather than eliminate the exception from discharge altogether.
VI. CONCLUSION
Congress must amend the Bankruptcy Code to reflect changes in
state divorce law. To enforce a husband's traditional obligations of
support to his ex-wife and children, § 523(a)(5) affords creditorspouses the right to exception from discharge in bankruptcy for all
debts in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support. This exception to discharge is faulty because it does not include debts characterized as property division among the debts that an ex-spouse may still
enforce after a bankruptcy filing by her husband. The Bankruptcy

dividing property. Id. at 181-82. Clark also states that equitable distribution gives "each
spouse that property which he or she equitably owned, recognizing that in marriage the title
to property often does not correspond to the rights of ownership." Id. at 181.
113. See id. at 294-320 (discussing enforcement of Domestic Alimony and Property Division Decrees).

114. See, e.g., supra note 28.
115. Singer, supra note 7, at 105.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 101.
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Code should be amended to include these debts for three reasons.
First, due to changes in state divorce law, it is now quite difficult for
a judge to differentiate between property division and support awards
because they share the same features and functions. Second, where a
distinction is possible, the current system is unfair to the creditorspouse because that spouse must first utilize property division remedies before being awarded non-dischargeable support awards. Finally,
the federal courts have been unable to develop a workable rule that
will provide divorcing parties with the security of knowing how their
award would be characterized. The best way to correct this problem
is to expand the exception to include divorce-related property division
awards.
David M. Susswein"

* The author would like to express thanks to Professor Alan Resnick and Professor
John Dewitt Gregory for their time and support, to Aileen Kent, Marc Susswein and Ruth
Albert for their unending encouragement and to my parents for always pushing me to do the
best that I can do.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1994

23

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 8

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol22/iss3/8

24

